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IT’S WRONG, BUT THAT’S THE WAY IT IS. YOUTH, VIOLENCE AND JUSTICE IN 
NORTH-EASTERN BRAZIL 




This article discusses the vertiginous proliferation of violence suffered and perpetrated by 
juveniles in the state of Bahia, north-eastern Brazil. Based on documentary and 
ethnographic evidence, it anatomizes the workings of law enforcement, juvenile justice 
and juvenile custody. It argues that the strategies of the police, the criminologies put into 
practice by the judiciary and the functioning of Youth Detention Centres collaborate to 
foster, rather than curb, youth offending and the violence committed by and against young 
citizens. Whereas prosecution and the dispensation of justice emphasize juvenile 
offenders’ responsibility for their “decision” to become a “bandit”, juvenile custody, as a 
result of deep-rooted clientelist practices, is dominated by precarious conditions of 
incarceration which promote internal violence and the (self-)ascription of a deviant 
juvenile identity. At the same time, the Othering of large sections of youth from the urban 
periphery has fuelled a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence between members 
of drug factions and police forces, resulting in an increasing illegibility of the state at its 
margins. 
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The hearings of the juvenile offenders, detained by the police the day before in the city of 
Salvador, had already terminated when a woman entered the building of the Youth 
Prosecution Service and asked for permission to talk to the prosecutor on duty. Because of her 
evident distress, she was shown through at once. As soon as the door of the prosecutor’s 
office was closed behind her, the woman unceremoniously presented herself as the mother of 
the 13-year-old Jonathan who, a couple of days before, had shot dead a plain-clothes police 
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officer during an assault of a city bus which went awry—an incident well known to all the 
persons present, as the case had attracted considerable attention in the local media.
2
 
During the assault, the officer, who was commuting to work (he didn’t own a car, as his 
family later reported to the press), had managed to shoot and subdue Jonathan’s adult 
accomplice in the front of the bus. However, in the course of the struggle, the older assailant’s 
weapon (a .38 revolver of the Brazilian brand Taurus), fell to the floor, towards the other side 
of the bus’s turnstile. Jonathan, who was by this time busy collecting passengers’ cell phones 
and money at the rear of the bus, quickly ran to the front and, despite being hit in the foot and 
in the arm by two shots from the officer’s weapon, succeeded in snatching the .38 Taurus 
from the floor, firing two deadly shots towards the policeman’s head and chest. 
Working as a cleaner in the hospital where the officer arrived shortly afterwards, already 
lifeless, Jonathan’s mother had coincidentally witnessed the suffering of the policeman’s 
family at close range. Her compassion for the deceased and his relatives, which she recounted 
in detail at the Youth Offending Services, however, soon became mingled with fears 
regarding her own son’s destiny. Another youth, initially suspected of being one of the 
assailants, was killed on the same day of the bus assault, just after leaving the infirmary where 
he had been treated for a gunshot wound in the foot. As Jonathan’s mother was anxious to 
stress, her son was willing to turn himself in, but remained in hiding as she was fearful of “the 
eventual reaction of a normal policeman”, as she called it. 
The prosecutor assured her that Jonathan, once he presented himself, would be 
accompanied by an official to the nearby station for juvenile offenders. As Jonathan’s mother 
was unable to get hold of her son by phone, it was agreed that she would bring him along the 
next morning. On the evening of that same day, however, Jonathan was spotted by the 
military police
3
 in the neighbourhood where he was hiding out, and shot dead as “he preferred 
trying to resist” detention, as an officer of the homicide department, cited in a note on the 
Public Security Authorities’ website, put it.
4
 
The fates of the 43-year-old policeman and 13-year-old Jonathan from Salvador (the 
capital city of the state of Bahia) are paradigmatic of the issues I will address in this article. In 
the first place, they point to the mounting dimension of youth violence and youth offending in 
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north-eastern Brazil, and the tender age of the juveniles involved. Second, they exemplify the 
failings of public policies regarding marginalized youths, the state’s lack of lack of interest in 
dealing adequately with those who come into contact with the juvenile justice system, and the 
persistent institutional marginalization of juvenile offenders who, eventually, are sentenced to 
serve a term in one of the state’s juvenile custody institutions. Third, they give an idea of the 
senseless suffering caused by an endemic illegibility of the state, particularly at its 
socioeconomic margins, which makes it increasingly difficult for citizens of all ages to tell the 
difference between “right” and “wrong”, perpetrator and victim, or state action and banditry, 
resulting in a “doubling” of violence between agents of law enforcement and, mostly juvenile, 
members of the organized drug trade. 
The discussion of this article is based on documentary evidence and longitudinal 
fieldwork at the Youth Prosecution Service of Salvador, the Juvenile Justice Court of 
Salvador, and two Youth Detention Centres (YDCs) in the same city. At the Youth 
Prosecution Service, I was authorized to attend the hearings of juvenile offenders conducted, 
at the time, by two different public prosecutors. The juveniles presented had generally been 
arrested the day before by the military police, spending the night in a cell of the specialized 
police unit for juvenile offenders.
5
 In around 30 of the more than 200 cases I attended, the 
prosecutors pleaded for pre-trial detention, either due to the violent character of the offence or 
owing to an offender’s repeated arrest for non-violent crimes. At the Juvenile Court (housed 
in the same building), I was allowed to follow juveniles’ trials and take notes during a couple 
of months, in the course of which a number of different judges presided over the proceedings. 
Finally, over the course of three years, fieldwork was carried out (during a total of six and 
four months, respectively) in a semi-secure and a secure YDC in Salvador.
6
 There, I was 
authorized to spent the day at the custody centres, participate in all activities, move around 
freely and conduct confidential interviews with all juvenile inmates.
7
 
In what follows, I will first try to give an idea of the omnipresence of youth violence in 
the city of Salvador and the north-eastern state of Bahia, the escalating quality of the violence 
involved, and how both are related to the dynamics and shifting geography of the drug 
economy. Drawing on the ethnographic evidence collected, I will then examine the way the 
Brazilian state currently deals with the phenomenon of youth violence, focusing on three 
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institutional fields: policing, justice and confinement. Each of these fields would certainly 
deserve a more thorough discussion on its own. I’ve chosen to condense the analysis of the 
workings of these institutions as much as possible, however, in order to explore their 
interrelatedness. While each of them is meant to diminish youth offending and youth violence 
(and their representatives might publicly argue that they in fact do so), I will seek to 
demonstrate that it is not only each institution’s actual (mal-)functioning that, in practice, 
makes them fail in this aim. On the contrary, from an empirical point of view, they seem to 
work hand in hand in fostering, rather than stemming, the process of marginalization of young 
citizens from the urban fringes, inducing those who have once come into contact with the 
police, the courts or custody centres to stick to, rather than give up, their violent offending 
behaviour. 
As Comaroff and Comaroff (and others) have noted, the liberal ideology of the state as an 
“an essentially benign institution”, which, in accordance with the Weberian model, 
legitimately exercises its monopoly over violence “in the name of protecting its citizenry from 
the threat of criminal disorder” falls short of accounting for the Janus-faced character of law-
making and law-breaking, and the development of a “judicial apparatus designed to protect 
and reproduce the wealth of its dominant class fractions” (2016: 12). The histories and 
institutional experiences of juvenile offenders in Bahia I draw on are paradigmatic for this 
ambivalence of a criminal/juvenile justice apparatus which, in the present case, intermingles a 
sentencing philosophy based on ideas of citizenship, righteousness and responsibilization with 
an extra-legal eye-for-an-eye strategy of violent law enforcement, and an institutional reality 
of abandonment derived from sub-legal quid pro quo practices. 
Rather than representing novel “strategies of crime control in contemporary society” 
(Garland 1996) or advanced liberal “regimes of control” for “the government of insecurity” 
(Rose 2000: 336), I argue that the workings of the police, the judiciary and the custodial 
system in Brazil are mainly expressions of a systematic (de)construction of identities of the 
criminal “Other”, which suits the interests, inherent dynamics and laissez-faire attitude of the 
institutions entrusted with dealing with “violent” youth. As such, the ad hoc tactics employed 
by the police to halt youth violence (through inflicting violence against youths), the 
administration of youth justice by juvenile courts (through the imposition of incarceration in 
notoriously unsuitable custodial institutions), and the implementation of juvenile custody (in 
prison-like institutions prone to horizontal and vertical violence) are not strategies, but the 
outcome of an “anti-strategy” which accepts the violence perpetrated and suffered by 
This is a pre-print version of the article which should not be quoted. 
For the final version refer to https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663920915967 
 
marginalized youths as an unalterable social fact, inherent to their, supposedly chosen, 
condition of sub-citizens. 
Mavelli has noted that violence has become “a governmental practice whose instrumental 
task is not, primarily, to contain or eliminate the threat stemming from certain populations, 
but to construct identities and subjectivities” (Mavelli 2016: 123). I will argue, however, that 
the propagation of the “bandit’s” identity in Brazil is just as much a cause as it is a 
consequence of the state violence employed against juveniles. Thus, the corporeal punishment 
(and the eventual extermination) of a juvenile suspect by law enforcement agents, from the 
point of view of the police, seeks to contain the violence of someone who “‘carries’ the crime 
in his own soul; […] not someone who commits crimes, but [who] will always commit 
crimes” (Misse 2010: 21). At the same time, it is this very violence suffered which 
corroborates the social “branding” of young citizens as criminal “immanent others” who 
“threaten our ‘good life’ and ‘deserve’ their treatment” (Mavelli 2016: 117). Ultimately, it is 
the concerted outlawing of juvenile offenders by society at large which makes the law “apply 
in no longer applying” (Agamben 1998: 28) to them, and which, in turn, reinforces their 
identity as “lawless” subjects. 
Consequently, the custodial sentence an offender eventually receives stems from a 
criminology which renders both the institutional violence a juvenile suffers preceding the trial 
and the violence he/she will suffer after the trial, although  unlawful, as conceptually “just” 
within the lifeworlds of those who “chose” to become “bandits”. Their incarceration in 
custodial institutions which knowingly violate their civic rights and, by means of the violence 
experienced within, reinforce their (self-)ascribed marginality, thus helps in shaping juvenile 
identities as much as it contributes to working out the very criminology it is based on. As a 
“working hypothesis” for juvenile justice institutions, it not only comfortable (inasmuch as it 
turns institutional malfunctioning into a virtue) but also “effective”, as it verifies, as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, the general conviction that juvenile “bandits” are doomed to repeated 
incarceration or death before adulthood. 
Violent Youth 
According to the press, the assault on the city bus of which Jonathan and the police officer 
were victims was motivated by a drug debt of 95 Brazilian Real (around US$ 27) the older of 
the two assailants (an unemployed house painter) had accumulated with the younger one. 
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While allegations of involvement with drug trafficking are frequently cited by police 
whenever suspects are killed in the course of police action (euphemistically called, in Brazil, a 
“record of resistance”, cf. Misse 2011), Jonathan had indeed been detained for drug 
possession a couple of months before. As his mother admitted, he was employed as an olheiro 
(look-out) by the drug faction operating in the neighbourhood where the family lived, a poor 
invasão (irregular settlement) behind Salvador’s general hospital. 
Hold-ups of buses are among the strategies used in Brazilian metropolises by whoever 
needs to make a considerable haul within a short period of time, like those who owe money to 
a boca (neighbourhood drug-selling spot). Together with street muggings, they have become 
endemic in Salvador, averaging around seven per day in 2015.
8
 Of the juveniles brought 
before the prosecutor in Salvador, a large number had built up significant debts with 
traffickers. Some owed money as a consequence of their own consumption “on credit”, others 
had purchased drugs on commission and, for some reason or other, were unable to pay back 
their bosses. It is a common practice for senior traffickers in Salvador to lend out firearms for 
armed assaults which, naturally, have to be compensated for if things go wrong—making 
petty offenders accumulate further debts and eventually compelling them to resort to more 
profitable (and detrimental) forms of criminality. 
Jonathan’s case is paradigmatic of a youth being, at the same time, agent and victim of 
violence. Like many others of his generation, he was caught up and partaking in the crossfire 
between the violence ubiquitous in peripheral neighbourhoods, where the reach of state power 
is limited, and the violence perpetrated by or in the name of the state itself, through “the 
enactment of highly visible, public performances of violence and power” (Larkins 2015: 15). 
During the hearings of juvenile offenders this indiscernibility of youth as a perpetrator and as 
a victim of violence made itself constantly evident. On the one hand, possession of firearms 
by adolescents is widespread, and their use, either during muggings or during assaults of 
enemy drug factions, commonplace. In 2014, firearms caused more than 70 percent of all 
homicides in Brazil, and homicide rates start to rise steeply from a victim age of 12 years on, 
reaching their peak at age 20 (Waiselfisz 2015b: 21; 50). To be held up by an adolescent 
carrying a gun in Salvador has become common to the point that potential muggers don’t 
actually need to carry or display a weapon: a great number of assaults investigated by the 
prosecutor had been committed with dummy pistols, or else simply by pointing, under the 
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shirt, with the index finger towards the victims, shouting, for instance, “give me that cell 
phone so I won’t kill you” (one offender). 
While it doesn’t take more than a gesture to hold up a passers-by, the use of real arms 
(which can easily be bought at some of Salvador’s city markets) is only a trifle, even among 
schoolchildren. One 16-year-old offender, for instance, had borrowed a .38 revolver to 
“frighten” her classmates who, she said, were threatening her for going out with the wrong 
guy. Another 16-year-old juvenile (arrested with a revolver loaded with five bullets of the 
same calibre) confessed that his plan was to kill the boyfriend of a girl with whom he had 
been having an affair, and who had beaten him after finding out. Another schoolboy, aged 15, 
told how he had borrowed a .22 revolver and killed a fellow pupil aged 13 by firing two 
bullets into his head “because he kissed” his 14-year-old girlfriend. 
On the other hand, deadly violence against youth has spread not only in the megalopolis 
of Salvador but throughout the state of Bahia. While there is little data available on youth 
offending in Brazil, the numerical “body count” of assassinated juveniles may give an idea of 
the ongoing proliferation of youth violence throughout the country. Just a decade ago, the 
cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were undisputed leaders in terms of the homicide 
statistics. In recent years, however, the Brazilian north and north-east have caught up and 
outstripped the former capitals of violence by far. While homicide rates went down 66 and 71 
percent from 2002 to 2012 in Rio and São Paulo, they have rocketed 74 and 222 percent in the 
Northeast Region and the state of Bahia, respectively (Waiselfisz 2014: 52; 37). 
This shift in the geography of violence is particularly marked as regards young citizens: in 
2012, the homicide rate of youth aged 15 to 29 in the city of Salvador was nearly five times 
that of São Paulo, and of the seven most violent municipalities of the country, five were 
situated in the state of Bahia (2014: 58). Next to Salvador (and part of its metropolitan area), 
the tiny municipality of Mata de São João has become the unchallenged national leader of 
youth violence, with a homicide rate of more than 372 in 2012 (2014: 62).
9
 This is almost six 
times the overall homicide rate of the world’s then most violent country, El Salvador (2014: 
73) or, to cite another example, 20 times, 33 times and 929 times the youth homicide rate of 
South Africa, the US and Germany, respectively (2014: 73-74).
10
 While, as Comaroff and 
Comaroff stress, in South Africa “more people die of malnutrition-related diseases, 
tuberculosis, and traffic accidents than from criminal violence” (2016: 51), in Brazil the youth 
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homicide rate (below 20 years of age) in 2013 was double that of deaths from car accidents. 
Among juveniles aged 16 or 17 years of age, homicides accounted for almost half of all 
deaths registered (Waiselfisz 2015a: 15; 19). 
The spread of violence from the Brazilian south and the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo to places even most Brazilians have never heard of (like Murici and Satubo, the runners 
up in homicide-by-firearms rates from 2012-2014, Waiselfisz 2015b: 42) is directly related to 
the dynamics of organized drug trafficking and the establishment of numerous drug factions 
in smaller cities of the Brazilian hinterland, and their struggle for local hegemony. In the 
course of the last two decades, the famous Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC, “First 
Commando of the Capital”) has managed to extend its near uncontested leadership throughout 
the state of São Paulo, today enjoying “a private monopoly of exercising violence” which 
allows it to “make use of well proportioned and graded forms and mechanisms of punitive 
control” (Dias 2011: 176; 259-60). In Bahia, the establishment of large-scale drug gangs is 
more recent, and numerous groups still compete fiercely for dominance. To give an example, 
Salvador’s oldest faction, the Comando da Paz (CP, “Peace Commando”), founded towards 
the end of the 1990s within prison, has recently lost ground to a number of up-and-coming 
factions like the Bonde do Maluco (BDM, “Lunatics’ Gang”) or Katiara, a small group of 
dedicated traffickers from the drowsy inland town of Nazaré das Farinhas, who have managed 
to dominate a number of neighbourhoods in the state capital. 
Youths are employed by drug factions from a very early age and, having grown up in 
neighbourhoods with a well-established drug economy, “do not see involvement in drug 
trafficking as an abnormal activity” (Dowdney 2003: 132). Subordinated to the business 
practices of the drug trade, sooner or later, they almost inevitably become perpetrators and 
victims of notable violence. One of the inmates of Brotas Youth Detention Centre, for 
instance, explained that he “had to murder to avoid being killed”. Being accused, by the 
chefão (big boss) of the area, of having sold 5 kg of cannabis on his own account, he was 
thrashed with a wooden club, until he eventually ended up putting the blame on another 
(innocent) member of the faction—who was subsequently beaten to death jointly by him and 
the other gang members present. The beating took place under the supervision of the chefão, 
who commanded that the victim should not be beaten on the head, “so that he wouldn’t die 
[right away], but suffer”. 
Another youth offender (presented to the Youth Offending Services) had been on watch 
during a party of the Bonde do Maluco, in the course of which a locally well-known singer 
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and composer was killed by the faction’s local chief. After shooting the singer dead—
apparently because his cousin, though belonging to the same faction, was considered a 
business rival, so that his presence in the “wrong” neighbourhood had aroused suspicions—
the chief ordered that all gang members present should do their bit in cutting the victim’s 
throat. During his hearing, the 16-year-old admitted that he had attempted, without success, to 
execute the chief’s order, making an effort to decapitate the singer with the help of a fish 
knife. A second youth, presented to the prosecutor a couple of days later, confirmed his 
participation in like manner, and both were remanded in custody. 
The juveniles’ accounts attest to the degree of violence inherent in gang life, and the 
difficulties of staying out of the dynamics of killing once having joined. As has been noted 
(Dowdney 2003: 124; Misse 1997: 13), while there is no pressure for youths to join a drug 
gang, being member of a faction means to belong to a community within which the exercise 
of violence is part of the game. Moreover, youth who join one faction are continually under 
the threat of being victimized by the members the others, as soon as they leave the confines of 
their neighbourhood. Salvador’s drug gangs employ a number of signs which are easily 
recognized by friend or foe. The allied Caveira and Bonde do Maluco, for instance, refer to 
themselves as “All Three” (Tudo Três), and (some of) their members shave three lines 
through their eyebrows, while the “All Two” members of the Comando da Paz use two lines. 
Analogous rules govern to the way members great each other, and the use of hand signs (with 
either two or three fingers), etc. Faction members who find themselves in the wrong place at 
the wrong time may thus quickly fall prey to the alemão (“the German”, a term used to denote 
members of rival factions), often being tortured before their killing. 
Policing Youth Violence 
Of those youths who don’t fall victim to their peers, a considerable share are put to death by 
the state itself. Jonathan’s fate is indeed not an exception: in São Paulo, for instance, “the 
police were responsible for around 10 percent of the homicides of the metropolitan region” in 
1999 (Caldeira 2013: 106). In the state of Rio de Janeiro alone, between 2001 and 2011, 
“more than 10,000 people died in clashes with the police”, even only considering official 
numbers (Misse 2011: 4; 20; 23). In Bahia, in 2016, more than twice as many citizens were 
killed during police action than in the course of robberies. 
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Misse has pointed to the fact that police work (in Rio de Janeiro) is based on a war-like 
modus operandi, which conceptually bisects the city into downtown street areas (asfalto) and 
informal urban settlements (favelas), within which “deadly police action is part of a public 
policy of fighting against crime” (2011: 120). While in Salvador the distribution of 
neighbourhoods considered “hot spots” for policing is somehow more homogeneous—not 
least for geographical reasons, as it lacks Rio’s picturesque scenery of hills, historically areas 
of settlement of the poor—the relationship of marginalized youths and the police is clearly 
that of two parties at war. Police (ab)use of force is rife, and to receive a thrashing by the 
police as a juvenile suspect is ordinary to such an extent that one offender, being questioned at 
the prosecutor’s office regarding a lesion on his face, spontaneously emphasized that it was 
not the result of a police beating. 
A great many juveniles mentioned during the hearings that they had been “beaten up”, 
“strangled”, treated to “punches in the face and kicks in the stomach”, pepper spray, “seven 
slaps in the face”, or being suffocated “with a plastic bag over the head”, to name just a few 
examples. The latter allegation of suffocation not only points to the use of professional 
techniques of torture, but may also demonstrate how juveniles adopt practices of violence 
“learned” from agents of the state. At the time of my research, inmates of Brotas YDC, 
apparently waterboarded one of their fellows to “convince” him to bring back some cannabis 
from weekend parole. As Larkins reports (2013: 566), investigation techniques based on 
suffocation are widely used by Rio’s special law enforcement unit BOPE (Batalhão de 
Operações Policiais), and have been made notorious throughout Brazil by the semi-fictional 
blockbuster film Tropa de Elite (“Elite Squad”)—a motion picture recommended to me by 
another inmate of Brotas YDC as a faithful portrayal of the violence engaged in by police and 
traffickers alike. Sentenced for robbery resulting in death, this juvenile knew what he was 
talking about: in the course of his questioning, a police officer had introduced a paperclip 
under his fingernail, “so that I would say who else was there”. 
Police use of force (deadly or not) in Brazil is closely related to notions of citizenship and 
moral economies which reflect the widespread conviction that there are “lives that are better 
dead than alive” (Scheper-Hughes 2015: 268). Lethal police action is considered justifiable “if 
the suspect was, at one point in his life, involved in criminal activities” (Misse 2011: 40). The 
narrative of juveniles from Salvador corroborated the importance of ascribed citizenship for 
the treatment an offender would receive from the police. One inmate of Brotas YDC, for 
instance, stated that the officers who detained him (he had committed a homicide and run over 
a motorcyclist while fleeing by car) were about to shoot him dead, arguing that “what I did 
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was dreadful. They said I was a monster, a murderer, a terrorist.” His life was spared, 
however, because another officer present happened to know his mother, who attended the 
same Protestant church—a fact which seemingly re-attached her son conceptually to the realm 
of citizens who deserve to live. 
The workings of law enforcement at the margins of the state has helped traffickers to 
depict their own (mis)deeds as morally tantamount or superior to those of the representatives 
of the state. Traffickers’ professed consideration for the concerns of the dwellers of the urban 
periphery, together with the framing of trafficking “as a form of politicized resistance to state 
oppression” (cf. Larkins 2013: 564; 2015: 31), has nourished, among a growing number of 
youths, a view of Brazilian polity within which the police are just another alemão, a state 
“faction” whose members don’t seem to abide by the law any more than the so-called 
“bandits”. In this regard, Wolff has noted that the “exceptionally violent strategies employed 
by the police” in Rio de Janeiro and Recife in the 1980s and 1990s created “moral incentives 
[…] to turn away from the state”, particularly among youths (2015: 22; 33; 27). Corroborating 
this observation, one of the inmates of Brotas YDC—who had received his first thrashing 
from the Military Police in Salvador when he was 13—remembered that: “From that day on, I 
really started to entertain myself doing robbery. I hit the streets, and robbed whoever I 
happened to meet.” 
Judging Youth Violence 
Juveniles who have committed violent crimes or are considered repeated reoffenders are 
generally remanded in custody for a maximum of 45 days and subsequently brought before a 
judge. As was to be expected, the overwhelming majority of juveniles presented to the 
Juvenile Court in Salvador came from the lower and lowest strata of Brazilian society. Before 
being imprisoned, most of them were struggling to eke out a living from the limited economic 
opportunities in reach of the urban precariat. The three most common professions of juveniles 
standing trial were street vendor (of bottled mineral water and other petty goods like chewing 
gum, ice lollies, etc.), car washer and auxiliary construction worker. Nearly all of them had 
abandoned formal education after around five years of elementary schooling. Juveniles 
generally replicated the socioeconomic marginality of their parents, whose most common 
professions were domestic servant, cleaner and street vendor. 
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The plain, office-like atmosphere of Salvador’s juvenile justice court and the eschewal of 
any signs of elevation, segregation or disempowerment of the various court actors (cf. Hanson 
1996: 57), could easily belie the extent to which the justice dispensed in these rooms is 
markedly a trial of the Other. In Bahia, the Brazilian state which comprises the municipalities 
with the highest proportion of Afro-descendants in the whole country,
11
 this Other is usually 
not only poor but also black. While around 22 percent of Bahia’s population is white, the 
proportion of white Bahians in prison is only half of that.
12
 Black judges, prosecutors and 
public defenders, on the other hand, are a rare sight.
13
 
As a matter of course, defendants belonged to a very different socioeconomic class than 
those entrusted to accuse, defend and judge them. They did so, however, to a notable extent: 
the average monthly total gross income of a first-instance state court judge in Bahia, at the 
time of writing, was R$ 53,460.78 (around US$ 16,093),
14
 which is more than 56 times the 
country’s minimum wage of R$ 937 (around US$ 282)—compared to, for instance, 2.7 times 
in Germany.
15
 The ratio of economic capital present in most trials (between the average 
income of the judge, prosecutor and public defender
16
 on the one side, and that of the 
defendant and his/her parents on the other side), thus amounted roughly to that of the price of 
a Mercedes-Benz SUV compared to that of a quality wheelbarrow.
17
 
While it may seem small-minded to subject the salary of public servants to scholarly 
scrutiny, this ratio is something to be kept in mind when anatomizing the local criminologies 
voiced by the different actors of the field of juvenile justice. Most theories of the causes of 
                                                 
11 Seventeen out of twenty of the municipalities with the highest proportion of (self-declared) black people 
belong to the state of Bahia (IBGE 2011: 48). 
12 See IBGE (2011: Tabela 3175) and DEPEN (2016: 33). Racial statistics in Brazil have to be interpreted 
with care, as they rely on different classification schemes and procedures (e.g. “black” vs. “dark-skinned”, 
ascription vs. self-identification).  
13 According to the judiciary census of 2013 (see: www.cnj.jus.br/pesquisas-judiciarias/censo-do-poder-
judiciario, accessed 1 August 2017), in Bahia 10 percent of the employees and 5 percent of the judges declared 
themselves “black” (preto). 
14 Data of December 2017, according to CNJ, Remuneração dos Magistrados 
(www.cnj.jus.br/transparencia/remuneracao-dos-magistrados, accessed 9 March 2018). 
15 At the time of writing, a judge’s starting salary in Germany was €4,295.54 in 2018, compared to a 
minimum wage of €1,593. See www.oeffentlicher-dienst.info/c/t/rechner/beamte/be?id=beamte-berlin-
2019&matrix=1(category R1) and www.bmas.de/DE/Themen/Arbeitsrecht/Mindestlohn/Rechner/mindestlohn-
rechner html. 
16 Public Defenders in Brazil are public servants, trained in law and advocacy, and employed by a state 
agency (Defensoria Pública). 
17 The average total gross income of a state prosecutor in Bahia in November 2017 was R$ 42,732.31, and 
that of a public defender in December 2017 R$ 24,626.19 (see 
www mpba.mp.br/area/portaltransparencia/biblioteca/1316 and www.defensoria.ba.def.br/transparencia/gestao-
de-pessoas/quadro-de-defensores-publicos/, accessed 9 March 2018), totalling R$ 120,819.28, or around US$ 
36,369. At the time of writing (accessed 1 August 2017), a Mercedes GLA 250 was listed at US$ 33,400 
(www mbusa.com/mercedes/vehicles); a “Big-4 Wheelbarrow” was listed at US$ 271.93 
(www homedepot.com/p/8-cu-ft-Heavy-Duty-Wheelbarrow-B4W-8/206625312). 
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juvenile offending, voiced explicitly or implicitly in the course of offenders’ trials, stressed 
the notion of a youth’s supposed “personal choices”. Judges and prosecutors would, for 
instance, suggest to defendants that “you still have the choice”, “you could be a citizen”, “you 
chose to live this kind of life” or that “you should think about what you want in life and make 
the right choices”. At the same time, juveniles were accused of having deliberately “thrown 
away all your opportunities”, “taken the road of crime” or “put yourself into a very dangerous 
environment”. 
Within the local judiciary’s “criminology of the Other” (Garland 1996), juveniles standing 
trial were believed to favour the life of the “bandit” (bandido) over that of the “righteous 
citizen” (a pessoa do bem), thus having to cope with the “natural” consequences of their 
decision. Emphasizing that he had “never seen somebody being arrested in the library or at 
church”, one judge explained to the defendant that there were “two possible roads of life: 
work, study, be a citizen […] or die before you’re 40”. 
Institutional violence was deemed an “unfortunate” but inevitable part of a bandit’s life. 
“Is it wrong?”, one judge rhetorically commented on the police violence a defendant had 
suffered. “It’s wrong,” he went on, “But that’s the way it is. The police give a thrashing, and 
later they ask who you are … They don’t want to know.” Another judge stated that “the police 
give a thrashing … but that’s how life is”. Still another judge commented on the slaps a 
defendant had received from the police saying that “this is what a bandit’s life is like: slaps in 
the face”. Curiously, the police and traffickers were often mentioned in the same breath, 
stating, for instance, that defendants were at risk of being “killed by the police, killed by 
bandits”, that “the trafficker kills, the police kill”, or else that “whenever you go to buy drugs, 
you risk the police detaining you, beating you, giving you a thrashing”. 
The above quoted comments might convey the impression that the actors of the judicial 
field would condone police and other institutional violence. This is not the case, however. It 
regularly happened that, as a consequence of juveniles’ hearings, prosecutors in Salvador 
demanded inquiries into police officers by the inspectorate, as did a number of judges and 
public defenders. Though not condoning institutional violence, it was, however, 
conceptualized as being intrinsic to the Brazilian polity and, particularly, to the lifeworlds of 
those who had made the “wrong choices”. 
Consequently, juveniles who had “decided” upon a bandit’s life were considered to have 
forgone their citizenship, at least partly. The main markers used to gauge a youth’s “degree” 
of citizenship were schooling, employment and the use of drugs. If, on the one hand, some 
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judges asserted that “to work will protect you throughout life” or that “the only way to 
improve your life is to study”, others affirmed that “it was the weed which took you where 
you are”. Frequently, judges would inquire of a defendant’s mother if this was a “well-
behaved boy” (um bom menino) and her response would be taken down as evidence in the 
case record. 
Those juveniles who displayed signs of alleged relinquishment of citizenship (for having 
dropped out of school, or being idle or having been caught buying marijuana) were deemed 
co-responsible for the physical and symbolic violence eventually suffered in the course of 
their institutional treatment. This included not only physical harm through police action but 
also the conditions of custody in YDCs. Moreover, the prevalence of institutional violence 
was readily employed, if with no ill intent, as an argument to make juveniles revert to a “well-
behaved boy’s” life. Alluding to the notorious conditions of pre-trial detention at Salvador 
YDC, for instance, defendants would be asked if they “enjoyed having being incarcerated 
there” (one judge) or if they “wanted to go back there” (another judge). 
Containing Youth Violence 
Most juvenile pre-trial and custody detention facilities in Bahia resemble adult penal 
institutions and suffer from the same vices, particularly overcrowding, horizontal and vertical 
violence (between inmates and/or between inmates and staff), sexual violence, internal drug 
trafficking and circulation of arms. One of the inmates of Brotas YDC, sentenced for 
homicide, recounted his time in Salvador YDC, where he was serving the initial period of his 
term, in the following way: 
They started to do some “tests” with me. Some resistance tests. They lashed me onto the bars, pulled off my 
shirt, and assembled ten, twelve [fellow inmates], hitting me in the stomach. Onto the bars of the cell? Onto 
the bars, with the arms outflung, my feet short of the ground, and started to throw out punches into my 
stomach. They took a soft drink bottle, doesn’t it have the part with the screw-cap? […] They started to beat 
me, ten, twelve [inmates] … with the bottle, that tip of the bottle, where you screw it open, taking off the 
cap. […] If you beat it against the leg, it will bleed, if you beat with force. So they beat me, my leg started to 
bleed. […] I told them: “Oh dude, you’re beating up […] a man. I ain’t no rat [informer], if you want to beat 
me, you can even kill me.” 
During the first three months of his stay, this juvenile, apart from the mentioned 
“resistance tests” (which should make sure he would keep his mouth shut about whatever was 
going on within the communal cell), was submitted “every day to something different” like, 
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for instance, waterboarding “with the head in a bucket”, or being wrapped in a sheet filled 
with cockroaches. Inmates’ self-imposed rules were strict, and “every trifle, when you were 
not obeying this or that rule, this or that guy … you would leave the cell completely battered, 
mouth, face, head, arm and leg broken”. Punishments were decided on collectively: “There is 
no chief. Everybody decides. For instance: if, out of 24, 14 or 13 agree … if these 13 decide 
to beat you up, then you’re beaten up.” Conflicts between different sectors of the YDC were 
frequent, and “if you were in the middle, you also had to fight. If you didn’t fight, nothing 
would happen then. But later there would be a gathering, and you would lose support, or be 
beaten up.” 
The inappropriate conditions of Salvador YDC have long been publicly acknowledged by 
all local institutional actors in juvenile justice.
18
 Built in the 1970s according to the prison-
style architecture of the YDCs conceived during the military regime (Carrera 2005: 63), it was 
originally called the Centre for Reception and Triage of Minors, later renamed as the Centre 
for Refuge of Minors, and is today called the Socio-Educational Community Salvador (CASE 
Salvador). It has seen a number of military rulers and democratic governors come and go but, 
up to the present day, has undergone no more than “small repairs in terms of paint and the 
like” (Arruda 2011: 83). In 2014, the Youth Prosecution Service filed an action against the 
state of Bahia and FUNDAC, the state agency responsible for the implementation of juvenile 
custody,
19
 requesting the closure of Salvador YDC for its “sub-human conditions […], lack of 
habitability, salubrity and hygiene”.
20
 
FUNDAC was founded in 1991 as the successor to the Bahian branch of the notorious 
National Foundation for the Wellbeing of Minors, itself the successor to the 1961 State 
Service of Assistance to Minors, baptized, by the press of the day, as the “subsidiary of hell” 
(Carrera 2005: 59). It was meant to put into practice the provisions of Brazil’s modern Statute 
of the Child and Adolescent (ECA), passed in 1990 after the country’s re-democratization, in 
accordance with the demands of the liberal Constitution of 1988 and international guidelines 
like the Beijing Rules and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
FUNDAC’s history is exemplary of the intricacies of Brazilian youth offending policies, 
and the way the state itself partakes in the propagation of violence of and against youths. The 
blatant contrast between the modern conception of the youth statute (ECA), as opposed to the 
                                                 
18 Conditions in Salvador YDC have improved over recent years. and violence among inmates, while still 
commonplace, has receded considerably. 
19 Fundação da Criança e do Adolescente. 
20 ACP 0540192-12.2014.8.05.0001, 1ª Vara da Infância e Juventude, decision of 26 November 2015. A 
new pre-trial detention facility was inaugurated in August 2017. 
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miserable conditions of actual custody, and the de facto relinquishment of the idea of 
rehabilitation of young offenders (the recidivism rate is around 85 percent; see Zoettl 2020), is 
notable. In Brotas YDC, every now and then, youth offending workers reported the death of a 
former inmate, nonchalantly showing around smart phone shots of young bodies—who had 
not long ago been released from or escaped state custody—wedged into the zippered plastic 
bags of the Medico-Legal Institute, with only their faces exposed. At the time of my research, 
Brotas YDC had turned into a near-abandoned institution, where inmates openly consumed 
marijuana, introduced firearms for their personal “protection” against the drug faction that 
dominated an adjoining neighbourhood and came and went at their convenience.
21
 
The reasons for this chasm between the progressive legislation and retrogressive practice 
are to be found neither in a lack of public funds nor a lack of commitment of the majority of 
educators, psychologists and youth offending workers responsible for juvenile offenders in 
custody, but rather in politico-institutional dynamics. The early years of FUNDAC had been 
marked by a spirit of optimism and a strong impetus to fulfil the newborn Constitution’s 
demand to ensure “young people, with absolute priority, the right to life, health, […] 
education, […] dignity, respect, freedom, […] as well as to guard them from all forms of 
negligence, discrimination, exploitation, violence, cruelty, and oppression” (CF-88: 227). In 
subsequent years, however, FUNDAC was soon to became part of the local networks of 
political bargaining and clientelism. 
FUNDAC’s “vices” were promptly inscribed in its founding document of 1992, which 
determines the creation of no less than 94 “commissioned posts”, to be designated at the 
discretion of its director, who, him/herself, is designated by the governor in office (D-1.203: 
Art. 38). Headed, at the time of my research, by the former wife of the Bahian governor in 
office, FUNDAC was described, in a recent investigation of the state Court of Audit, as “an 
‘empty’ entity […] which effectuates practically all of its activities by means of outsourced 
personnel” (TCE/BA 2017: 5) from another foundation. That foundation—headed, at the time 
of my research, by the present wife of a member of the Bahian House of Representatives—
provided the bulk of the staff actually dealing with juveniles, complementing FUNDAC’s 
administrative personnel of 566 with another 1,700 full-time external employees. In 2015, 
FUNDAC’s total annual expenditure amounted to R$ 118.19 million (around US$ 36 
                                                 
21 At the time of writing, Brotas YDC was closed down and the inmates had been transferred to another 
semi-secure custody institution. 
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million), that is, around US$ 162 per day for every juvenile in custody—comparable to the 
average expenditure for juvenile custody in the UK.
22
 
Youth, Violence and Justice 
Wacquant’s caveat concerning Brazil’s deployment of “the penal state to respond to disorders 
spawned by the […] immiseration of large sections of the urban proletariat”, condensed into 
the catchy slogan of a “dictatorship over the poor” (2003: 200), continues to be valid 
inasmuch as the country’s prison population has increased by 136 percent over the past 13 
years, maintaining its thoroughly homogeneous socioeconomic composition, with zero 
percent of prisoners with higher education.
23
 Wacquant’s discussion falls short, however, of 
elucidating the causes of the proliferation of violent crime and its interplay with the dynamics 
of governmental crime management—which refuse to be reduced to the “social insecurity that 
everywhere pushes people into crime”, the “enforcement of the class order” or a “political 
culture […] of authoritarianism” (Wacquant 2003: 201; 199; 200). 
Based on the experiences of juvenile offenders from Salvador, I argue that three aspects 
may primarily be held accountable for the notable increase in the quantity and quality of 
youth and state violence over the past decades in Brazil. The first of these is the bureaucratic 
pseudo-managerialism of crime control, under the sway of crony capitalism and rentier 
governance, where the exploitation of state monopolies (like the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force, which includes institutional punishment) is commissioned to profit-
seeking entities as an obscure politico-financial quid pro quo. Second is the public Othering 
and scapegoating of a whole stratum of underprivileged youths from the socioeconomic 
periphery; and, finally, there is the mounting illegibility of the Brazilian state in general, and 
its law enforcement apparatus in particular, which has fuelled the escalation and reciprocal 
“doubling” of violence between state agents and juvenile citizens. 
As Garland has argued, the erosion of “the myth that the sovereign state is capable of 
providing security, law and order” engenders novel governmental rationalities of either 
adaptation or denial, together with an “official criminology that fits our social and cultural 
configuration” (1996: 448; 462). In Brazil, the runaway proliferation of the organized drug 
                                                 
22 According to the UK Audit Commission, each juvenile in custody cost £50,800 per year or around 
US$ 172 per day (see Goldson and Muncie 2006: 150). On 17 April 2015, there were 602 juveniles held in 
custody by FUNDAC, according to the Central de Vagas e Regulação. 
23 See DEPEN (2016: 34). Numbers rounded to full percent by the reference source. 
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trade and its successful enrolment of a steadily growing number of youths have resulted 
mainly in punitive state action, endorsed by a criminology which, first, emphasizes juveniles’ 
personal responsibility for “choosing” to become “bandits” and, second, conceptualizes the 
great majority of juvenile offenders as incorrigible anti-citizens foredoomed to premature 
death or lifelong imprisonment (cf. Misse 2011: 116). 
The societal consensus that juveniles who have once come into touch with trafficking will 
hardly ever turn into “righteous citizens” again has nurtured, throughout the field of juvenile 
justice, a pseudo-managerialism which neither emphasizes “economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness” (Garland 1996: 455) nor seeks to implement “policies that ‘work’” (Muncie 
2006: 775), but has found its main vocation in the bureaucratic administration of juvenile 
marginalization itself, and the financial and political sinecures it may offer. Salvador’s former 
Vocational School for Minors, housed in a colonial mansion in the “most salubrious locality 
of the Bahian capital” (Carrera 2014: 64), may serve as an allegory for this process: 
inaugurated in 1933, it came to serve 417 children in 1947, providing classrooms, refectory, 
infirmary, dental treatment, workshops for carpentry, woodwork, printmaking and a bindery.
24
 
Today, the same building is exclusively occupied by the administrative personnel of 
FUNDAC, which oversees the custody of slightly more juveniles, out-housed to 
malfunctioning YDCs and being taken care of by outsourced contract employees. 
While juvenile custody in Bahia has turned into a bargaining chip in the forging of local 
governmental alliances, the massive Othering of youths from the urban peripheries and their 
subsequent criminalization replenishes the already overcrowded YDCs, which often serve as 
an entry gate for the country’s adult prison system, itself subject to a policy of privatization. 
In Brotas YDC, the majority of inmates had noticeably adopted their branding as “bandits” 
and seemed to anticipate a career behind bars. To give an example, one inmate, who had 
repeatedly been taken into custody for possession of arms and street muggings, justified his 
refusal to participate in an extramural bakery course arguing “Why should I learn a 
profession? I already have one!” 
The self-fulfilling prophecy of the non-success of juvenile custody recalls not only 
Foucault’s argument that “the supposed failure [is] part of the functioning of the prison” 
(1979: 271) but also Tilly’s notion of the state as a protection racket (1985: 170-171). As has 
been demonstrated, Brazil’s correctional institutions play a leading role in the organization 
                                                 
24 See Carrera (2014: 73; 78; 209). The school was renamed as the Instituto de Preservação e Reforma in 
1938. 
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and consolidation of organized crime (see, for instance, Dias 2013: 211). The criminalization 
and incarceration of masses of juvenile citizens thus not only entails significant social costs, 
but also aids and abets their further marginalization, thus guaranteeing a continual supply of 
recruits for the country’s drug factions—to be combated by the state by the same means that 
were conducive to its establishment, and so on. 
Along with prison, death has become an unacknowledged but notorious constituent of 
Brazil’s “public policy of crime fighting” (Misse 2011: 120), unfailingly victimizing the same 
demographic groups, that is, “young dwellers of the peripheries” (Dias et al. 2015: 165), 
“street kids, unemployed Black men, petty criminals, and vagrants” (Scheper-Hughes 2015: 
289) or simply “black male bod[ies]” (Caldeira 2006: 136). In 2015/16, of all victims of 
police action in Brazil, 99 percent were male, young (82 percent aged from 12 to 29 years) 
and black (76 percent).
25
 As Misse has observed, “the mere fact of living in a favela with drug 
trafficking” sets a precedent “to assume the subjects’ dangerousness and the legitimacy of 
their deaths” (2011: 134). Urban favelas in Brazil have come to display a number of 
characteristics Agamben attributes to concentration camps, particularly “the materialization of 
the state of exception […] in which bare life and the juridical rule enter into a threshold of 
indistinction” (1998: 174). 
However, the juvenile Brazilian homo sacer is generally not “killed by anyone” 
(Agamben 1998: 116), but either by his/her peers or the agents of the state. The ongoing 
carnage in the favelas, in which juveniles and state agents partake simultaneously as 
perpetrators and victims, rather points to Girard’s (1977) notion of “mimetic violence”. As 
Jonathan’s case reminds us, it is not only juvenile bodies who fall victim to crime. In 2016, 
453 police officers were killed in Brazil, 23 percent more than the year before (FBSC 2017: 
23). For São Paulo, Dias et al. have traced a “cycle of action and reaction” in the lethal 
confrontations between the police and members of the PCC, which in 2012 issued a “General 
Order” (Salve Geral) determining that “for every member of the group executed by the police, 
two officers of the same police force shall be killed” (2015: 171). 
Throughout Brazil, the deadly entanglement between the police and youths from drug 
factions has clearly come to bear signs of what Girard terms “monstrous doubling”, the 
outcome of a “sacrificial crisis” in the course of which “the distinctions delegated to the 
members of society by the cultural order succumb to the reciprocal violence and are merged 
into a communal mass” (1977: 315). The increasing illegibility of Brazil’s institutions of 
                                                 
25 See FBSC (2017: 12-13; 31). 
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political representation, judicature and law enforcement, the difficulties, not only of young 
citizens, in distinguishing dignitaries from villains, guilty from not guilty and good from bad, 
keeps fuelling this reciprocal emulation of violence. While juvenile offenders standing trial 
are reminded that they “could be a citizen” had they not chosen to be bandits, those who can 
afford a well-versed lawyer in Brazil may easily delay their sentencing indefinitely by filing 
successive petitions of habeas corpus. As Dowdney (2003: 134-135) remarks, “favela 
children understand the rules of trafficking from an early age”—and often far better than 
those of the society of the “righteous citizens”. 
The workings of extra-legal police use of force in Brazil are complex and, as has been 
noted, subject to shifting political conjunctures (Caldeira 2000; Misse 2011; Nunes 2018). For 
the present purpose, it suffices to note the extraordinary frequency and quality of the violence 
employed. Nearly all juveniles of Salvador YDC reported violent encounters with the police, 
and the majority had been subjected to varying techniques of torture which, remain etched in 
their memories: 
“He laid me on the ground. You know this sack of fabric? Fabric or plastic? Of fabric, a sack of fabric. 
Which is sewn. He put it on me, took a bottle of petrol, covered my head, and started to pour, so that I would 
swallow the petrol. At that moment there … I thought that I would die. But that I wouldn’t speak, that I 
won’t say anything. That I will die like a man.” 
The account of this juvenile who, at the time of the interview, had been committed to the 
same YDC for the third time, points to the importance of notions of manhood in the battle 
between police and trafficker forces. The frequent clashes between heavily armed tactical 
units and adolescent traffickers represent, however, more than an unequal competition of 
masculinity. From a police point of view, torture and the eventual extermination of juvenile 
suspects are conceptualized as “violence […] used for good, not for evil” (Larkins 2013: 567) 
exerted against “individuals considered ‘incorrigible’ and hence ‘killable’” (Misse 2011: 
40)—that is, as Girard would put it, as violence “that is limited for the sake of achieving or 
maintaining order” (Girard and Williams 1996: 70). 
Yet, from the point of view of its victims, it is precisely this deliberate use of extra-legal 
violence which renders state action and the acts of enemy traffickers indistinguishable. As a 
consequence, the hatred many juveniles nurture for rival drug factions coalesces with their 
hatred for the police. The following quote of the same inmate of Salvador YDC gives an idea 
of how the violence suffered subsequently turns into a sentiment of hate, difficult to rein in, 
and which most likely will find expression in further violence, perpetrated by the former 
victim, and so on:  
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“If I come upon them [the police], it’ll be a lot of bullets at them. Even if I die, it’ll be a lot of bullets at 
them. You feel hatred for them? I do, and how! It’s that often I don’t like to express what I feel. But if I 
come upon them, wherever it’ll be, in whatever situation … If I’ll have a grenade at hand, see a police car 
stopping, I throw the grenade inside the car. And beat it. If later they want to kill me, let them kill me. It’s 
all the same to me.” 
As Girard’s mimetic theory suggests, conflicts between equals “have the greatest risk of 
turning violent, because the social limitations that normally prevent or channel mimetic desire 
are missing” (Palaver 2013: 66). In Brazil, where the exercise of violence is less than ever 
exercised in the form of a legitimate state monopoly, the ultimate mimetic desire has become 
violence itself, seeking the extermination of the “immanent other” (Mavelli 2016). Where the 
“government of insecurity” has failed to “deliver security to the population at large” 
(Garland/Rose), the “fascination of superior violence” all the more “strikes men as at once 
seductive and terrifying; never as a simple means to an end, but as an epiphany” (Girard 1977: 
152)—that is, the epiphany that good and evil, though apparently indistinguishable, might still 
be kept apart. 
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